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An Ex Parte Order May Not Serve the Function of a
Search Warrant Under the Fourth Amendment
To Authorize a Physical Intrusion in
Connection With a "Search" for
Conversations-People 11. Grossman*
There was probable cause to believe that defendant Scandifia
implicated in a larceny of jewelry by false pretenses. Pursuant
to section 813-a of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure,1 the
Supreme Court in New York County issued an ex parte order
authorizing the installation of an eavesdropping device in a service
station owned by Scandifia. Shortly thereafter, police broke into
was

• 45 Misc. 2d 557, 257 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (Sobel, J.) (hereinafter cited
as principal case).
l. "An ex parte order for eavesdropping • • • may be issued by any justice of the
supreme court or judge of a county court or of the court of general sessions of the
county of New York upon oath or affirmation of a district attorney, or of the attorney•
general or of an officer above the rank of sergeant of any police department of the
state or of any political subdivision thereof, that there is reasonable ground to
believe that evidence of crime may be thus obtained, and particularly describing the
person or persons whose communications, conversations or discussions arc to be over•
head [sic] or recorded and the purpose thereof. • • • In connection with the issuance
of such an order the justice or judge may examine on oath the applicant and any
other witness he may produce and shall satisfy himself of the existence of reasonable
grounds for the granting of such application. Any such order shall be effective for
the time specified therein but not for a period of more than two months unless ex•
tended or renewed by the justice or judge who signed and issued the original order
upon satisfying himself that such extension or renewal is in the public interest."
N.Y. CODE OUM. PRoc. § 81!1-a (Supp. 1965).
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the station's private office and installed a microphone. Conversations
were overheard which indicated that defendant Grossman had in his
possession two pistols received from Scandifia. An affidavit setting
forth these conversations supplied the sole probable cause for a
warrant authorizing a search of a car owned by Grossman and seizure
of the pistols. On the basis of the evidence thus obtained, the
defendants were indicted for illegal possession of weapons and
conspiracy. They moved to suppress the tangible product of the.
search-the pistols-on the ground that the probable cause for the
issuance of the warrant was based on information obtained in
violation of their rights under the fourth and fourteenth amendments.2 Held, motion granted. Under the fourth and fourteenth
amendments, no warrant may issue for a search and seizure of mere
evidence. Electronic eavesdropping, which is inherently a quest
for mere evidence, must be prohibited regardless of judicial authorization, once the protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures has been brought into play by the occurrence of a trespass.8
In 1928 the Supreme Court of the United States held, in Olmstead v. United States,4 that wiretapping is not proscribed by the
fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures. That holding was based on the fact that wiretapping lacks
the essential characteristics of conventional search and seizure:
physical entry and seizure ·of tangible property.5 Although Congress
has since outlawed all wiretapping, 6 the rationale of Olmstead- re2. The application of the fourth amendment to the states through the fourteenth
amendment is well settled. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
3. In a comprehensive opinion, Justice Sobel discussed many constitutional prob•
lems raised by electronic eavesdropping, but chose to rely on the grounds stated in
the text.
4. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
5. Id. at 464-66.
6. Wiretapping is now governed by § 605 of the Communications Act, 48 Stat.
1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1964), which was interpreted in Nardone v. United States,
302 U.S. 379 (1937), as prohibiting the admission of wiretap evidence in the federal
courts. In the second Nardone case, 308 U.S. 338 (1939), the Court interpreted § 605
as requiring the federal courts to exclude all evidence derived from wiretapping. The
second Nardone case also indicated that interception alone, even without divulgence,
constitutes a violation of § 605. But cf. Williams, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping·
Problem: A Defense Counsel's View, 44 MINN. L. REv. 855, 858 (1960). Section· 605 does
not, however, protect against the admission of wiretap evidence in state courts. See
Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952). But cf. Pugach v. Dollinger, 277 F.2d 739, 744 (2d
Cir.) (concurring opinion), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 458 (1960). See generally DASH,
KNOWLTON & SCHWARTZ, THE EAVESDROPPERS 385-406 (1959) [hereinafter cited as DASH];
Bradley & Hogan, Wiretapping-From Nardone to Benanti and Rathbun, 46 GEo. L.J.
418 (1958); Kamisar, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Professor's View,
44 MINN. L. REv. 891 (1960); Rosenzweig, The Law of Wiretapping, 32 CORNELL L.Q.
514 (1947); Schwartz, On Current Proposals To Legalize Wire Tapping, 103 U. PA. L.
REv. 157 (1954); Westin, The Wire Tapping Problem-An Analysis and a Legislative
Proposal, 52 CoLUM. L. REv. 165 (1952); Comment, Wiretapping-The Federal Law,
51 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 441 (1960).
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mains a barrier to the control of other forms of electronic eavesdropping. 7 Thus, in Goldman v. United States 8 the Court extended
the rationale of Olmstead to another type of eavesdropping and
ruled that the placing of a detectaphone on the party wall of a
hotel room, allowing police to overhear conversations held within
the adjacent room, did not constitute a violation of the fourth
amendment. In both Goldman and Olmstead it was noted that a
different question would have been presented if the eavesdropping
had been achieved by means of a physical trespass.0 More recently,
while preserving the basic holding of Olmstead and Goldman that
the overhearing of conversations does not amount to a technical
search and seizure, the Court has held that the fourth amendment
does provide some protection against electronic eavesdropping.10
Thus, in Silverman v. United States,11 eavesdrop evidence obtained
by the insertion of a spike microphone into a party wall was excluded. The Court expressly declined to reconsider Goldman, but
rather based exclusion of the evidence solely on the finding of "an
unauthorized physical penetration."12
Although this language would seem to admit the possibility of
an authorized "penetration," the question has apparently never been
faced by an appellate court. Section 813-a of the New York Code
does not explicitly sanction judicial authorization of physical "penetrations" in connection with eavesdropping, but such authorization
must have been considered implicit in the statute, since the legislature was primarily concerned with the prevention of unauthorized
"bugging"-the practice of concealing a microphone within a room,
typically the home or office of the victim.18 Despite this legislative
7. The term "electronic eavesdropping" ordinarily includes wiretapping; in this
note, however, it is used to mean all forms of electronic eavesdropping except wire•
tapping.
8. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
9. Id. at 135; Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928).
10. Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964) (memorandum decision), reversing
Clinton v. Commonwealth, 204 Va. 275, 130 S.E.2d 437 (1963); Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961). See also United States v. Pardo-Bolland, 348 F,2d 316 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 34 U.S. L. WEEK 3201 (U.S. Dec. 6, 1965).
11. Silverman v. United States, supra note 10.
12. Id. at 509. See Kamisar, Illegal Searches or Seizures and Contemporaneous In•
criminating Statements-A Dialogue on a Neglected Area of Criminal Procedure, 1961
U. ILL. L.F. 78, 123 n.206, 123-28; cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963),
13. See REPORT OF THE NEW YORK JOINT LEGISLATIVE CoMMITI'EE ON PRIVAGY OF COM•
MUNICATIONS AND LICENSURE OF PRIVATE INVESTIGATORS 17 (1962): "As to eavesdropping
by secret microphone, on which Congress has never acted, the Supreme Court has
pronounced new constitutional law. Notably, in the Silverman case of 1961, it reversed
the conviction of a Washington gambler. District of Columbia Police had driven a
spike, ingeniously equipped with a microphone, through the wall of Silverman's
house, thereby overhearing conversations within. The Supreme Court noted that this
was done without a warrant, and was 'accomplished by means of an unauthorized
physical encroachment within a constitutionally protected area.' As to this, we observe
with satisfaction that New York law [§ 813-a], enacted in 1958 on the initiative of
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intent, the court in the principal case limited, on constitutional
grounds,14 the application of the statutory procedure to that eavesdropping which can be achieved without physical penetration. The
first premise in the reasoning which led the court to this result
was that under Silverman "eavesdropping, ... accompanied by a
trespass, constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure in violation
of the fourth amendment." 15 In the court's view, the entry by which
the "bug" was planted was a trespass. 16 Thus, the court first concluded that the activity in question was unlawful and then proceeded to inquire whether that prima fade unlawfulness was avoided
by the court order.
In answering this question in the negative, the court relied on .
the rule enunciated in Gouled v. United States17 and other cases18
that searches for and seizures of objects of "evidentiary value only"
are prohibited by the fourth amendment. Under the Gouled rule,
searches made pursuant to a warrant,19 as well as those incident to
a lmvful arrest without a warrant,20 are limited to fruits of the
crime, instrumentalities of the crime, and contraband.21 The court
in the principal case reasoned that since conversations do not fall
within any of these categories but are mere evidence of guilt, and
since a search for mere evidence violates the fourth amendment,
a "search" for conversations is always prohibited, whether authorized
or not.22 The court was careful to limit this holding to eavesdropping
achieved by physical intrusion upon a constitutionally protected
area.28 However, since all successful electronic eavesdropping, regardless of physical intrusion, involves the acquisition of mere
evidence;- the thrust of the court's reasoning condemns with equal
force eavesdropping of the type specifically upheld in Goldman.
this Committee, requires the issuance of a court order (i.e., a warrant) to authorize
and validate evidence obtained by secret microphone. We hope and trust that this
will be found in accord with the principles set forth in the Silverman case." (Emphasis
added.)
14. Principal case at 574, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 283.
15. Id. at 562, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 271.
16. Ibid.
17. 255 U.S. 298, 309-11 (1921).
18. See, e.g., Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 237-38 (1960); Harris v. United
States, !l31 U.S. 145, 155 (1947); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464-66 (1932);
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1885). See generally 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2184a, at 45-46 (McNaughton rev. 1961) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE]; Shellow,
The Continuing Vitality of the Gouled Rule-The Search for and Seizure of Evidence,
48 MARQ. L. REv. 172 (1964); Comment, Limitations on Seizure of "Evidentiary Objects"
-A Rule in Search of a Reason, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 319 (1953).
19. See Gouled v. United States, 255. U.S. 298, 309-11 (1921). Compare Zap v.
United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946).
20. See United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 466 (1932).
21. See Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 154 (1947).
22. Principal case at 574, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 282-83; cf. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 163;
Williams, supra note 6, at 864-67.
23. Principal case at 578, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 286.
0
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Indeed, it is difficult to avoid the force of Mr. Justice Douglas'
argument in Silverman that the Court should concern itself with
all the actual, rather than merely the physical, encroachments upon
privacy.24 Logically the evidence-only rule should apply to all eavesdropping if it applies to any, but such an application of the rule
would be inconsistent with the views expressed in the Olmstead and
Goldman cases. However, it is arguable that this inconsistency caused
by the application of the Gouled rule in the principal case might
have been avoided by use of the analysis to be suggested here.
Since it is a limitation on what may lawfully be seized, the evidence-only rule can have no application without an initial determination that there has been a seizure within the meaning of the fourth
amendment. The instant court's interpretation of the Silverman
case as holding that electronic eavesdropping involving physical
penetration amounts to a fourth amendment search and seizure2G is
therefore of critical importance. This interpretation would seem to
conflict with the literal construction given the fourth amendment
by the Supreme Court in Olmstead and Goldman-that conversations, not being "persons, houses, papers [or] effects"26 are inherently
incapable of being "seized" in the constitutional sense.27 The court
in the principal case said, in effect, that Silverman and the later
case of Wong Sun v. United States28 modified Olmstead and Gold•
man to the extent that conversations may now be considered to
have been "seized," within the meaning of the fourth amendment,
when the eavesdropping is accomplished by means of a physical
intrusion.29 Such an interpretation would be permissible were it not
for the express, albeit grudging, refusal by the majority of the
Court in Silverman to reconsider the holding of Goldman. 80 Unless
this refusal is to be regarded as mere judicial hedging, an alternative
explanation of Silverman, one consistent with Goldman, is required.
A more plausible alternative would be to read Silverman as excluding the eavesdrop evidence not because it was illegally "seized,"
but because its acquisition was "tainted" by a prior illegality-the
"unauthorized physical penetration."81 This interpretation is rein24. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961) (concurring opinion),
25. Principal case at 562, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 271.
26. U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV.
27. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928).
28. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
29. Professor Broeder is of the opinion that Silverman and Wong Sun foreshadow
the ultimate demise of Olmstead and Goldman. See Broeder, Wong Sun v. United
States-A Study in Faith and Hope, 42 NEB. L. REv. 483, 614 (1963): "[T]he main
premise· of Olmstead is not trespass, but that conversation is not an 'effect.' Silverman
and Wong Sun destroyed that premise and Olmstead along with it." But see note 31
infra and accompanying text.
30. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961).
31. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). For an
exposition of the distinction between the exclusion of intangible evidence, such as
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forced by the Supreme Court's express reliance upon Silverman, in
the non-eavesdropping context of the Wong Sun case,82 to exclude
incriminating statements obtained as the result of an illegal entry
and arrest. The two cases present parallel applications of the same.
principle; both decisions exclude intangible evidence as the "fruit
of the poisonous tree," not as illegally seized. In Wong Sun the
"poisonous tree" was the illegal entry and arrest; in Silverman, it
was the unauthorized penetration.88
If this line of reasoning is valid, eavesdropping accompanied
by a validly authorized penetration would seem to stand on exactly
the same constitutional footing as that found permissible in Goldman, since no prior illegality is present to taint it. The proper
inquiry in the principal case would then concern the legality of
the physical intrusion. Under New York law, a forcible, surreptitious
entry, such as in the principal case, would seem to be lawful when
validly authorized.84 The intrusion here, however, was not confined
to the entry of the officer who planted the "bug," but extended to
the continued presence, for almost five months, of the microphone
in defendant's office. It would therefore appear that periodically
incriminating evidence, as illegally "seized," and exclusion as "the fruit of the poisonous tree," see Kamisar, supra note 12, at 123-28. As Professor Kamisar points out, there
has been considerable confusion on this point. Id. at 125. For an illustration of the
confusion, compare McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 458-59 (1948) Gackson,
J., concurring), with Williams v. United States, 263 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
32. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963).
33. The author of the opinion in the principal case takes a different view of Silverman and Wong Sun. See SOBEL, CURRENT PROBLEMS IN nm LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE
105 (1964):
"Silverman is thus the first recent (see also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471 (1963)) practical recognition of the dual nature of the Fourth Amendmentthat the first or privacy clause forbids the search for evidence (with or without a
wanant) by trespass into the privacy of home, office, etc.-while the second or
search warrant clause permits search for tangibles to which the People or Government have the primary right but only with a search warrant."
It is difficult to understand the basis for these conclusions. Neither Silverman nor
Wong Sun discusses the evidence-only rule. Moreover, there is nothing to in<;licate that
exclusion was based on anything other than the initial illegality-the pen~tration in•
Silverman and the entry and arrest in Wong Sun. In fact there were positive indications that had valid warrants been obtained the evidence would have been admissible.
See Wong v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963); Silverman v. United States, 365
U.S. 505, 509 (1961).
34. See N.Y. ConE CRIM. PRoc. § 799 (Supp. 1965), which allows forcible entries to
preserve evidence. Section 801 permits nighttime searches when specially authorized.
Section 813-a must be read as implicitly authorizing such tactics in view of the peculiar requirements of "bug" planting. See note 13 supra. See also People v. Johnson,
231 N.Y.S.2d 689 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1962) (search of unoccupied premises held constitutional).
Under this analysis it would seem arguable that the legality of the trespass depends
on its purpose and therefore that a trespass to secure mere evidence may not be authorized. Under the fourth amendment as construed in Olmstead and Goldman, however, the securing of this type of evidence, i.e., conversations, does not require authorization. Thus the purpose is constitutionally permissible and cannot be used to invalidate the physical intru~on.
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renewed, validly issued judicial authorization would be required
both by the fourth amendment and by section 813-a for the duration
of the intrusion.85 Although the court found that there was sufficient
probable cause to support the initial issuance of the eavesdrop
order, no new probable cause was supplied to support the two extensions of the order.86 Thus, when the incriminating conversations
were finally overheard some four months after the initial issuance
of the order, there was no effective probable cause to justify the
continued intrusion, and the authorizing order would have been
invalid for that reason alone.37 Moreover, the fact that the "bug"
was in operation for so long a time, regardless of probable cause,
would seem to render the search exploratory, placing it within the
proscription of the fourth amendment.88
Thus, had the court confined its inquiry to the legality of the
intrusion, it would have reached the same result that it eventually
reached through its application of the evidence-only rule. In placing
full reliance on that rule, however, the court necessarily outlawed
all eavesdropping accompanied by an intrusion. A narrower inquiry,
based solely on the legality of the intrusion, would have allowed
eavesdropping when reasonable-when there is effective probable
cause to support the court order, and the length of operation does
not render the search exploratory.30
The unavoidable result of the decision in the principal case
appears to be that a New York policeman who has probable cause
and obtains a court order may eavesdrop only if the circumstances
enable him to do so without a physical intrusion. Freedom from
official eavesdropping is thus made to depend on the sophistication
of police equipment or the thickness of a wall. 40 Moreover, if the
rationale of the principal case were applied in a jurisdiction which
provides no statutory safeguards against eavesdropping,41 as it must
35. New York provides for renewal or extension when the judge who originally
issued the, eavesdrop order satisfies himself that it is in the public interest. N.Y. CODE
CRIM. PROC. § 813-a (Supp. 1965). Cf. Westin, supra note 6, at 203-04.
36. Principal case at 568, ~57 N.Y.S.2d at 277.
37. See People v. Chippewa Circuit Judge, 226 Mich. 326, 197 N.W. 539 (1924).
38. See, e.g., Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
39. The requirement that the warrant particularly describe the things to be seized,
discussed in the principal case at 567-68, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 276-77, does not arise under
the suggested interpretation of Silverman (see text accompanying note 27 supra) since
nothing is seized. The same is true of the problem of "unrelated" seizures, discussed
in the principal case at 568-69, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 276-77. However, the problem of new
probable cause to support the extensions of the order is common to both approaches,
regardless of whether there is a seizure. The court apparently concluded that lack of
new probable cause vitiated the order, but declined to rest its decision on this con•
clusion. See principal case at 568, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 277.
40. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 513 (1961) (concurring opinion of
Douglas, J.).
41. New York was the first state to provide for court-ordered eavesdropping; three
other states have subsequently enacted similar statutes. See MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 272,
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be if it is required by the fourth amendment, the result would be
even more anomalous. For example, a policeman could not employ
a "spike mike" even if he had probable cause and had obtained a
warrant. However, a policeman with a parabolic microphone42 could
eavesdrop without any restriction whatever.
It is arguable that, on the basis of past Supreme Court decisions,
primarily Olmstead and Goldman, the question of the applicability
of the evidence-only rule should never have been reached in the
principal case.48 However, there is a distinct possibility that these
cases will ultimately be overruled and eavesdropping brought
within the terms of the fourth amendment.44 Should this occur,
the rationale of the principal case in applying the evidence-only
rule would assume great significance. The application of the
Gouled rule would result in the complete prohibition of eavesdropping,45 eliminating any possibility of a judicially controlled
process. There are cogent arguments against the application of the
Gouled rule to electronic eavesdropping,46 and there is no compel§ 99 (Supp. 1964); NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 200.660, 200.670 (1959); ORE. REv. STAT. § 171.720
(1959). See also DASH 430-37.

42. For a description of devices that require no physical penetration, see DASH
346-58.
43. See text accompanying notes 30-31 supra.
44. Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Beaney, The Constitutional
Right to Privacy in the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REv. 212; Symposium on The
Griswold Case and the Right of Privacy, 64 MICH. L. REv. 197 (1965). Griswold is significant both for its expansive approach to the Bill of Rights and for its discussion of a
right of privacy. See also Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 457-63 (1962), where
Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Goldberg indicated their disagreement with Olmstead,
and the separate opinion of the Chief Justice, 373 U.S. at 441, suggesting that he
might join in overruling at least Goldman.
45. It has been assumed throughout this note that conversations are inherently
mere evidence. In certain instances, however, the courts have broadened the meaning
of "instrumentalities" to avoid the effect of the Gouled rule. For example, in a conspiracy case conversations might be considered the instrumentalities of the crime. Cf.
Kamisar, supra note 6, at 914-18.
46. The Gouled rule is probably a historical anomaly. See 8 WIGMORE § 2264 n.4;
Kamisar, supra note 6, at 914 n.129; Comment, supra note 18. It has been said the rule
cannot be justified on policy grounds. See Inbau, Public Safety v. Individual Civil
Liberties-The Prosecutor's Stand, 53 J. CRIM. L., C. &: P.S. 85, 87 (1962); Kamisar,
Public Safety v. Individual Liberties: Some "Facts" and Some "Theories," 53 J. CRIM.
L., C. &: P.S. 171, 177 (1962). Applications of the evidence-only rule have led to striking
inconsistencies. Compare Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), with Zap v.
United States, 328 U.s: 624 (1946). One court concluded that the issue as to what are
instrumentalities as opposed to mere evidence "turns more on the good faith of the
search than the actual distinction between the matters turned up." Matthews v. Correa, 135 F.2d 534, 537 (2d Cir. 1943). This has led to the suggestion that the rule would
not stand in the way of a comprehensive statutory scheme for the regulation of wiretapping. See Kamisar, supra note 6, at 916-18. The same considerations would seem
applicable to eavesdropping. But see Williams, supra note 6, at 870-71, where it is
suggested that the Gouled rule is inapplicable to wiretapping only insofar as the telephone itself, as opposed to the conversations, is considered an "instrumentality."
The Supreme Court has applied the rule only in cases involving the seizure of private papers. See Shellow, supra note 18, at 179. Moreover, Mr. Justice Jackson once
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ling case for its application, because the rule does not attack the
most objectionable aspect of eavesdropping. The most obnoxious
feature of electronic eavesdropping is not that it permits the acquisition of mere evidence, but that it invades privacy to an extent
heretofore unknown, and in such a way that the individual has
little or no opportunity to know of the invasion.47 It would seem
that the rejection of the evidence-only rule would be far more
likely if there were a sound basis for allowing limited eavesdropping
under safeguards which rendered it no more objectionable than
conventional investigatory practice. Although a detailed examination of the regulatory problem is beyond the scope of the present
discussion, ttvo observations are appropriate. It is well accepted
that the requirement of probable cause is the heart of the fourth
amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.48
The probable-cause requirement does not protect pl'ivacy in general.
The fourth amendment permits invasions of privacy, provided there
is sufficient probability that the offended individuals are guilty of
a crime. It is submitted that electronic eavesdropping is as capable
of fulfilling this probable-cause requirement as any conventional
method of search.49 With regard to eavesdropping, however, the requirement of probable cause establishing that the thing to be seized
will be found in the place to be searched is especially pertinent.
For example, in the principal case the investigating officer should
have been required to show not only that the defendant was probably implicated in the crime, but also that there was reason to
believe he would be discussing the crime in his office during the
period of the proposed eavesdropping.50 If this requirement were
strictly observed, the possibility of overhearing irrelevant conversations _would seem to be diminished. Furthermore, the time span
covered by the eavesdropping is crucial. It would seem that the
statutory period of two months in New York is too long,51 and that
a reasonable period should be measured in hours or days, not
months. A longer period suggests a "fishing expedition" and would
render the search exploratory.
suggested that the rule of the Gouled case was "inapposite in the field of mechanical or
electronic devices designed to overhear or intercept conversations." On Lee v. United
States, 343 U.S. 747, 753 (1952). See also Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 140
n.7 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting). But see Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 463-65
(1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting); United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306, 311 n.17 (2d Cir.
1951) (Frank, J., dissenting).
47. See Schwartz, supra note 6; Williams, supra note 6, at 862-68. See also Paulsen,
Safeguards in the Law of Search and Seizure, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 65, 72 (1957).
48. See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 464 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
49. See ibid.
50. It seems likely that once there is probable cause to believe that the suspect is
implicated in the crime, satisfaction of this additional requirement will tend to be
assumed. Cf. Westin, supra note 6, at 203.
51. But see id. at 203-04.
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It is possible that these and other appropriate restrictions, vigorously observed,62 ·would render the practice of electronic eavesdropping virtually useless to law-enforcement officers.53 On the other
hand, it has been persuasively argued that no amount of safeguards
can be sufficient to bring the practice within the realm of what ought
to be permissible.54 As was emphasized by Justice Sobel in the
principal case,55 the secrecy surrounding the issuance of eavesdropping orders, and the fact that the courts encounter only that eavesdropping which successfully obtains evidence of guilt, probably
preclude a valid judgment as to either the indispensability of
eavesdropping to law enforcement or the actual danger of eavesdropping to privacy. Although Justice Sobel is to be commended for
his scholarly explanation and application of constitutional principles, his reliance on the evidence-only rule in the principal case
seems unfortunate, since he passed up an opportunity for experimentation in judicial control. A holding that the practice under
consideration was unconstitutional in this particular case because
it was unreasonable, not because the evidence-only rule renders it
unconstitutional in every case, might have been a better first step
toward a "solution where the rights of individual liberty and the
needs of law enforcement are fairly accommodated." 56 Assuming
that such a solution is possible, it can be devised only by experimenting with meaningful standards of control.
1

52. In his discussion of a possible federal law authorizing wiretapping, Edward
Bennett Williams has suggested that one judge in each district be appointed by the
Chief Justice to handle wiretap applications, in order to ensure conscientious judicial
supervision and prevent "judge-shopping." See Williams, supra note 6, at 869.
53. Cf. id. at 869. Law enforcement officials are reluctant to submit wiretapping
and eavesdropping to traditional controls. See, e.g., Silver, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Prosecutor's View, 44 MINN. L. R.Ev. 835 (1960). One reason for this
reluctance may be that wiretapping and eavesdropping are not used in traditional
ways. That is, they are used for surveillance and crime prevention rather than crime
detection. See Parker, Surveillance by Wiretap or Dictagraph: Threat or Protection1
A Police Chief's Opinion, 42 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 727 (1954). See also DASH 129, 221-22, 251.
Section 813-a authorizes the issuance of orders for eavesdropping when there is probable cause to believe that "evidence of crime," i.e., crime in general, will thereby be
obtained. As is pointed out in the principal case at 568-69, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 277, the
fourth amendment would seem to require probable cause as to evidence of a specific,
named crime.
54. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 6, at 855.
55. Principal case at 579-80, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 287.
56. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 465 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See
Westin, Wiretapping-The Quiet Revolution, 29 COMMENTARY 333, 340 (1960).

